control the flow of parts and to ensure that its promise of delivering parts to customers within 24 hours would be kept.
In September 1998, PriceWaterhouseCoopers ("PwC"), Caterpillar's auditor, presented a plan to Caterpillar management that was explicitly designed to reduce Caterpillar's US effective tax rate. The first recommendation in the PwC plan was to restructure the parts business.
11 Under the pre-1999 structure, any profit that Caterpillar made from selling parts directly to customers in the US or overseas was taxed by the US.
Moreover, any profit that Caterpillar's foreign subsidiaries made on selling parts they acquired from Caterpillar to their customers was also taxed by the US because it was "Subpart F income" and therefore resulted in a deemed dividend to Caterpillar under IRC sections 951-960. About 85% of the total profits were earned directly by Caterpillar, while the other 15% were Subpart F income.
PwC proposed to set up a Swiss entity, Caterpillar Sarl ("CSARL"), which would be treated as a corporation for Swiss tax purposes but as a partnership for US tax purposes (this was possible under the newly adopted "check the box" regime for classifying foreign entities for US tax purposes). The partners in CSARL were two Swiss subsidiaries of Caterpillar. CSARL would then assume ownership of the parts in the Morton warehouse. If those parts were intended for the US market, CSARL would sell them to Caterpillar at no profit, and Caterpillar would resell them and report the profits on its US tax return like it did before 1999. However, if the parts were intended for customers overseas, CSARL would sell them to independent dealers, which would resell to the non-USA customers, with the bulk of the profit going to CSARL.
12
The purpose of this structure was to avoid paying US tax on the profits from the sale of parts to non-US customers by eliminating Caterpillar from the supply chain. The 11 PwC, Caterpillar Plan, Appendix C, Solution 1 (September, 1998). Overall, PwC was paid about $55 million for its contribution to reducing Caterpillar's US taxes. 12 For example, if before the restructuring Caterpillar would buy a part from a supplier for 2 and sell it to a Swiss marketing subsidiary for 8, who would in turn sell to a customer or dealer outside Switzerland for 10, the result would be that Caterpillar would pay US tax on 8 (6 of its own profit and 2 Subpart F deemed dividend from the Swiss subsidiary). After the restructuring CSARL would buy the part from the supplier for 2 and sell directly to a dealer outside Switzerland for 10, and the resulting profit of 8 would belong to CSARL and not be Subpart F income because under Subpart F base company income does not include profits from sales for resale if both transactions are with unrelated parties.
4 parts would be purchased directly by CSARL from suppliers and sold directly by CSARL to the independent dealers overseas, without ownership passing through Caterpillar. This would avoid Subpart F because it does not apply to sales by CSARL to unrelated parties outside Switzerland unless the parts were acquired from a related party (i.e., Caterpillar).
However, physically nothing was changed. The parts were still shipped by the suppliers to Morton and shipped by Caterpillar from Morton to the independent dealers, without any involvement by CSARL. 13 Caterpillar still ran the logistics business as it did before, except that it did so as an agent for CSARL, the owner of the parts destined for foreign markets. CSARL had no warehouse or inventory management system, and the parts business remained "US centric." 14 Moreover, there was no physical distinction at
Morton between parts destined for the US market (and therefore sold to Caterpillar at zero profit) and parts destined overseas. All the parts were inventoried by Caterpillar as before, except that a "virtual inventory" was created to track for tax purposes whether any given part was owned by Caterpillar or by CSARL at any given moment. 15 Moreover, if a part intended for the US or overseas was missing, Caterpillar would "borrow" the part from CSARL, or vice versa, and restore it later as new parts came in (of course, without affecting the physical movement of any part). 16 Currently, nearly 70% of the purchased finished parts Caterpillar sells overseas come from the US, and the parts business continues to be led and managed from the US.
17
13 According to Craig Barley, a senior CAT manager, in the early 2000s 85% of Cat's worldwide parts inventory was managed from Morton, and 296 of the 300 employees involved in the parts business were located at Morton. The aim, however, was to increase the inventory managed from Morton to 100%. PWC-PSI-CAT00179037. A February 2012 memo to the board described the "as is" parts business as worldwide suppliers shipping parts to the "master distribution center" in Morton, from which they were shipped to distributors both in the US and overseas. The memo discusses future plans to open more warehouses overseas (e.g., in Dubai) to reduce the shipping costs of this US-centric structure. 14 Caterpillar board minutes, February 8, 2012. For example, all of the inventory in the Grimbergen facility overseas was controlled from Morton, 5,000 and 8,000 employees involved in the parts business were in the US, and 5 of 8 parts warehouses were in North America. CAT 001896 (Feb. 2012); CAT 0002791 (December 2013). CSARL has 400 employees, or less than 0.5% of Caterpillar's workforce (Steines report, 4). 15 Physically, the parts were indistinguishable and kept in the same bin. Stiles deposition. 16 Over time, CSARL also acquired parts from Caterpillar facilities in France and Belgium, which were shipped directly from these facilities to CSARL's customers. The French and Belgian suppliers were reimbursed on a contract manufacturing basis so once again the bulk of the profit was allocated to CSARL as the "entrepreneur" in this transaction. 17 CAT 001866 (March 7, 2014); Steines report, 5.
This "business restructuring" enabled Caterpillar to shift over $8 billion in the period from 2000 to 2012 from the US to Switzerland without affecting the actual way in which the parts business was run. 18 In fact, it was important to Caterpillar not to change the successful business model of its parts and parts delivery business, and therefore the tax department reimbursed the parts and parts delivery segments of Caterpillar for any added costs resulting from the restructuring. This resulted in maintaining the "accountable profits" of each segment of the business as if the restructuring had not taken place, which was crucial to achieving cooperation since accountable profits formed the basis for setting compensation levels. 19 Nor were any personnel involved in the parts business moved to CSARL when it took over as nominal owner of all the parts in Morton.
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In order to defend this restructuring from a transfer pricing challenge by the IRS, PwC calculated a royalty rate of 15% (later reduced to 4% to 6%) to be paid by CSARL to Caterpillar to compensate it for any value inherent in its contribution to CSARL's parts related profits. The royalty rate was based on a comparability study performed by PwC.
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If this royalty rate could be defended in court, the result would be a successful shift of 85% of the total profit from parts business from the US (30.5% effective tax rate on Caterpillar) to Switzerland (4% effective tax rate on CSARL). The total tax benefit to order for a transaction to be respected for tax purposes, it must satisfy either or both prongs of the economic substance test, which are (a) the subjective prong, i.e., that the taxpayer or its agents believe that the transaction has a valid non-tax business purpose, and (b) the objective prong, i.e., that the transaction has a reasonable possibility of generating a profit regardless of the tax consequences.
The IRS could argue that the Caterpillar restructuring fails to meet either prong (under the codified version it must satisfy both). On the subjective prong, the PwC documentation from 1998 onward is clear that the main purpose of the restructuring was to reduce Caterpillar's effective tax rate by removing the parent company from the parts supply chain, thereby avoiding Subpart F deemed dividends and achieving deferral for CSARL's profits. 22 Moreover, a senior Caterpillar executive was asked under oath "was there any business advantage to CAT to have this arrangement put in place other than the avoidance or deferral of income taxation at a higher rate," and he answered in the negative.
23
On the objective prong, while CSARL's parts business is very profitable, it is
hard to see what the non-tax reason could be for changing the structure from sales by Caterpillar to sales by CSARL. The entire restructuring was done so as not to change the business model of the parts business. No significant employees were moved to CSARL, the parts continued to be shipped to and from Morton by Caterpillar, and the physical parts were indistinguishable. Moreover, steps were taken to separate the ownership for tax purposes under the "virtual inventory" from the actual inventory, which remained in Caterpillar. It is true that over time CSARL assumed ownership of more parts that were not shipped through the US, but it is still hard to see what was and is the business purpose of CSARL nominally owning the parts shipped via Morton, including the parts it sells at cost to Caterpillar. To answer this question we need to address the knotty problem of corporate taxation and CSR.
Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility
Should corporations pay tax?
The usual understanding of this question relates to the debate on whether there should be a corporate tax. Many observers have recently criticized the corporate tax, and some have defended it, but that is not the focus of this article. 28 Instead, I will assume that the state wants to tax corporations, for whatever reason (a safe assumption, at least in the short to medium run). Given this assumption, I will address whether corporations should cooperate and pay the corporate tax, or should it engage in "strategic" tax behavior designed to minimize or eliminate its corporate tax burden?
The answer to this question is related to the voluminous debate around corporate social responsibility (CSR The answer to the question of whether corporations should try to minimize their tax payments by any means that the law may permit thus depends on our view of CSR.
That view, in turn, depends on our view of the corporation. Historically, three views of the corporation have emerged and rotated in cyclical fashion. 30 The first is the view that the corporation is primarily a creature of the state (the "artificial entity" view).
The second is that the corporation is an entity separate from both the state and from its shareholders (the "real entity" view). The third is that the corporation is merely an aggregate of its individual members or shareholders (the "aggregate" or "nexus of contracts" view). Each of these three views has different implications for the issue of tax and CSR.
Under the artificial entity view, the corporation owes its existence to the state and is granted certain privileges in order to be able to fulfill functions that the state would like to achieve. Thus, engaging in some forms of CSR is part of the corporation's mission, and paying corporate tax is one way of fulfilling the corporation's CSR obligations.
Under the real entity view, the corporation is similar to an individual citizen in its rights and obligations. Just like an individual citizen does not have a legal requirement to aid her follow citizens but is praised if she does so, so the corporation may not be required to engage in CSR, but corporate management should be encouraged if they do so. As for taxes, just like an individual citizen, a corporation is legally required to pay taxes, and is expected not to engage in over-aggressive tax planning to minimize its tax obligations.
The most interesting debate is under the aggregate or "nexus of contracts" view of the corporation, which is the dominant view among contemporary corporate scholars. because it could mean that neither corporations nor the government can fulfill their responsibilities to society. That is not an acceptable outcome.
The following discussion is divided into three parts. Part III of the article briefly summarizes the development of the three views of the corporation. Part IV applies these three views to the question whether corporations should seek to minimize their corporate tax. Part V concludes by applying these answers to the case study introduced above.
The Three Views of the Corporation: A Historical Perspective 33
Historically, the corporation evolved from its origins in Roman law in a series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or members had to be developed, and this development was only completed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation, i.e., a corporation with several members who chose others to succeed them, had legal personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibility) and unlimited life, was well established in both civil and common law jurisdictions. The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership corporations to forprofit business corporations, which took place in England and the U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations whose shares are widely held 33 This part is based on Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformation, supra.
and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last major transformation was from corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises whose operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still going on today.
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more temporary one which occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s with the advent of hostile takeovers) was accompanied by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the state; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.
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Each of these theories has different implications for the legitimacy of CSR, as indicated in the following table: 34 These three theories are the standard ones in the literature. See, e.g., Millon, supra. For a full exposition of these developments see Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra. as Germany and Japan), or statist (depending on hierarchical solutions in resolving coordination problems, such as France).
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The varieties of capitalism framework suggest that firms in each of the three models of economic governance will distinguish themselves in different fields. In liberal market economies, the advantages of a flexible regulatory structure benefits industries targeting low costs and those operating in sectors characterized by radical innovation (e.g., software, bio technology). In corporatist economies, high levels of business coordination benefit sectors that rely on long-term contracts, and firms specialize in high quality, scale intensive and specialized supplier industries (autos, machine tools, chemicals). Statist economies favor large scale-intensive industries that have long time horizons or require major capital investment (autos, transport).
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There is an obvious correlation between the three varieties of capitalism described by political economists and the three historical theories of the firm outlined above. The liberal model of the UK and the US, with its emphasis on arm's length relationships and public trading, best first the aggregate theory of the firm. As I have shown elsewhere, however, even in the US context the aggregate theory has not always been dominant. 40 In fact, throughout most of the history described above, the real entity theory was the dominant one, and it can be argued that in practice most corporations are still operating on the basis of the real theory, not the aggregate one.
Thus, CSR, which as we have seen is most easy to justify in all its forms on the basis of the real theory of the corporation, is likely to remain practiced for the future. From the artificial entity view the corporation is a creature of the state. The state creates it and bestows various legal advantages on it, such as legal personality and limited liability. The state also creates the conditions for the corporation to operate in the market by providing defense and a property rights regime, as well as building infrastructure and educating workers.
The implication of this view for CSR, as noted above, is that the corporation is obligated not to impose additional burdens on the state that created it. Thus, to the extent the corporation's own activities result in additional burdens (e.g., by creating pollution), the corporation is obligated to remedy that situation.
It is less clear that the artificial entity view requires or permits corporations to engage in CSR that is unrelated to their activities. While historically the state created corporations "imbued with a public purpose", developments since the mid-19 th century (such as general incorporation and the decline of ultra vires) have led to the view that the corporation fulfills its purpose sufficiently in engaging in its normal for profit activities, and should not be required to do more.
However, precisely that limitation also has implications for the corporate tax. To the extent the corporation is free to pursue purely for profit activities, as long as those do not impose a burden on the state, the state is left with the obligation to carry to weight of social responsibility on its own. For example, if there is a health crisis that the corporation did not contribute to creating, such as AIDS, the state and not the corporation has the obligation to address it. But this means that the state needs resources, and a major way of obtaining these resources is to impose taxes, including the corporate tax.
I would therefore argue that under the artificial entity view corporations have an affirmative obligation not to engage in aggressive tax planning designed to reduce their tax burden. The state created the corporation and the conditions for its operation in the market. In return, the state may legitimately expect corporations not to impose additional burdens on it. But since the state and not the corporation bears the burden of most social obligations under this model, the state can also expect the corporation to contribute its fair share to the ability of the state to fulfill its obligations to its citizens. This means that when the corporation engages in aggressive tax planning such as corporate tax shelters or abusive transfer pricing, it is breaching an implicit bargain with the state that created it, gave it legal rights, and created the conditions for it to make those same profits it is attempting to shield from tax.
Of course, this begs the question of how to distinguish abusive tax evasion from legitimate tax avoidance. But while this is a hard question to answer from the government's perspective, or in a court of law, it is less unclear from the corporation's perspective. Most corporate tax managers know very well when a transaction is tax motivated as opposed to having a non-tax business reason. Thus, a corporation can be legitimately expected to police its own behavior in this regard, without worrying too much about where the line should be drawn. Under the real entity view, the corporation is similar to an individual. It is an entity made up of people (corporate managers and employees) that is separate from both the state and from its shareholders. 48 The implication for CSR is that our view of CSR activities that are unrelated to the corporation, but are beneficial to society at large, should be the same as our view of such behavior by individuals: It should not be legally required, but is praiseworthy and should be encouraged when it happens. This is the view most management takes of CSR, and judging by their advertising, the view of the general public as well.
What are the implications of the real view for corporate strategic tax behavior? Judge Learned Hand famously stated in 1935 that there is "not even a patriotic duty" for 47 The exception would be tax competition, which can be argued represents legitimate business planning from the corporation's perspective. 48 As one sociologist has stated, "[t]he recurrent problem in sociology is to conceive of corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the behavior of individuals or of human aggregates." Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, 192 Science 665 (1976) . A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study of organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. See, e.g., James D. citizens to pay their taxes; instead, it is the state's obligation to force them to do so.
But even if that statement could be taken literally in 1935 (and there are grounds to doubt that Hand meant it seriously), it certainly cannot be applied in the post-World War II environment, in which the obligation to pay the income tax was shifted from the rich to the middle class.
49 While much of the success of the US in collecting the income tax stems from its sophisticated use of withholding and information reporting, it is by no means true that nobody pays taxes voluntarily. If that were the case, the estimates for compliance in the absence of withholding or information reporting would be far below 70%. The US tax system could not work unless the majority of its citizens were trying to abide by the law, not evade it.
The importance of voluntary compliance can also be demonstrated by the contrast between the US and countries in which there is no tax-paying "culture". The US is far more successful in collecting the taxes due than countries like Italy or than most developing countries, where the citizens indeed follow Hand's dictum (or even regard it as their patriotic duty not to pay taxes). The reason for the US' relative success, even in an era of sharp cutbacks in IRS audit and enforcement activity, is that most US citizens do regard it as their duty to try to comply with the tax law. That is also the reason why the US can depend on most residents filing a tax return and selfassessing their tax liability every April 15, even though the refund they typically get 49 Hand's statement was dicta in the context of the most famous case shutting down an avenue of tax avoidance, Gregory v. Helvering. As Assaf Likhovski has shown, this statement (and the whole opinion) should be understood against the background of the contemporary hearings into tax evasion by rich and famous Americans such as Andrew Mellon. It seems to me that if pressed even Hand would acknowledge that the tax system could not work if everybody tried as hard as Mellon did to avoid paying their taxes. is without interest and means that they have been giving the government an interestfree loan.
In general, the modern literature on tax enforcement assumes that there exists an "enforcement pyramid". 50 At the bottom are the majority of citizens whose inclination is to try to comply with the tax law. As you go up the pyramid, the appetite for avoidance increases and the number of citizens decreases, and the type of enforcement changes from cooperation and the provision of information to increasingly harsher enforcement measures. Where the pyramid is reversed and most citizens do not cooperate, enforcement fails. In that way tax law is no different than other laws: A modern state cannot exist unless most citizens could be expected to comply with the law most of the time.
From that perspective, if the real view of the corporation is the correct one, the implication is that the corporation should behave like an ordinary citizen: It should try to comply with the tax law to the best of its ability. Thus, it is legitimate for corporations to try to minimize taxes paid on ordinary business transactions, but it is not legitimate to engage deliberately in strategic tax behavior designed solely to minimize its taxes. As stated above, while this line is difficult for the government or a court to draw from the outside, it is not so hard to discern from the perspective of the corporation. Strangely from today's perspective, this was in fact the attitude that most corporations took to tax compliance before the 1990s. The tax function was not viewed as a profit center, and while corporations tried to minimize tax costs, large publicly held corporations did not engage in tax shelters (and were in fact quite conservative in tax matters profit maximization is an illegitimate "tax" imposed by management on the shareholders, without the accompanying democratic accountability.
It is easy to see how this view can lead to strategic tax behavior. If tax is considered a cost like any other cost imposed on the corporation, it behooves the management to try to minimize this cost, or even turn it into a profit. Thus, the goal of shareholder profit maximization can naturally lead to corporations trying to minimize taxes and thus enhance earnings per share.
In the early 1990s, two factors led an increasing number of corporations to adopt this view. First, management compensation was linked to earnings per share via stock options, and although this led to abuses in some cases (even leading to corporations like Enron paying additional taxes on fictitious earnings), in most cases the mechanism worked properly, inducing management to focus exclusively on increasing earnings per share. Second, consolidation in the accounting field led the "Big Four" accounting firms to try to move beyond their traditional audit functions to devising tax strategies to be sold to individual corporate clients.
Increasing competition among corporations and increasing pressure on top management to deliver higher EPS explains the rest. Once some firms adopted aggressive tax strategies and saw their effective global tax rate plunge and their EPS increase, management in other firms came under pressure to deliver similar results. It became commonplace for the CEO and CFO, who never bothered to look at a lowly cost center like taxes before, to summon the Tax Director and require an explanation why their global effective tax rate was several percentage points higher than the competition. The Tax Director, who was already under pressure from the accounting firms to try out novel tax strategies, usually succumbed. Thus a significant number of conservative firms came to adopt aggressive tax strategies. The rhetoric of shareholder profit maximization came to provide a convenient cover and rationalization for this activity.
A good example of the spread of this type of strategic tax behavior is the saga of inversion transactions. Before 1997, most corporate managers assumed that shareholders would not tolerate a publicly traded US corporation reincorporating in Bermuda, despite the fact that such transactions could significantly reduce the overall effective tax rate. However, after Tyco inverted in 1997 and its stock price went up, there was increased pressure on competitors, resulting in about 15 more inversions.
This wave only stopped after September 11, 2001, when public outcry against "unpatriotic" corporations and ensuing changes to the tax law blocked the phenomenon, at least temporarily. The inversions were defended in the name of shareholder profit maximization, even though as Desai has shown they may also have made it easier to fudge corporate accounts and harm shareholders.
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What is wrong with reducing taxes as a way of maximizing shareholder returns? The basic problem is that under the aggregate view most CSR activities are illegitimate.
This necessarily means that they devolve upon the state, which is supposed to use its It will immediately be argued that this scenario is unrealistic: since in OECD member countries the corporate tax amounts to less than 10% of total tax revenue, the state can replace the lost revenue from corporate tax avoidance by raising other taxes. But even if one sets aside issues of distribution and fairness (lowering taxes on capital usually means higher taxes on labor), this answer is inadequate for three reasons.
First, there may be political constraints to raising other taxes; especially in the US context it seems glib to say that politicians could respond to a decline in the corporate tax by raising individual tax rates. Second, individual tax rates may already be set so high that it becomes highly inefficient and potentially counter-productive to raise them further. If individual rates are set very high, there will be an impact on both the labor/leisure trade-off and on the willingness of individuals to pay taxes, on which the system depends. Finally, in many non-OECD countries, as well as in some OECD members like Japan, the corporate tax amounts to a far higher percentage of total revenues. It has been shown that tax competition, which is itself a form of strategic 53 In developed countries, the state may delegate some of its social responsibility to the non-profit sector. But this is no solution, since under the aggregate view for-profit corporations are prohibited from donating funds to non-profits as well, unless it can be shown that such contributions enhance shareholder returns (which is doubtful). Moreover, the non-profit sector is weak or non-existent in developing countries, where the CSR issue is most acute.
tax behavior, has resulted in significant declines in tax revenues in developing countries, which have not been offset by tax increases elsewhere. state to carry out those functions that they are barred from pursuing since they are unrelated to the goal of shareholder profit maximization. This, in fact, can be seen as another justification of imposing tax on the corporation: Rather than bear any social responsibility, the corporation can by paying its taxes shift that responsibility to the state, where it belongs.
Thus, strategic tax behavior seems to be inconsistent with any view of the corporation. Under the artificial entity view, it undermines the constitutive relationship between the corporation and the state. Under the real view, it runs contrary to the normal obligation of citizens to comply with the law even in the absence of effective enforcement. And under the aggregate view, it is different from other forms of shareholder profit maximization in that it weakens the ability of the state to carry out those functions that the corporation is barred from pursuing. It would thus seem that whatever view management takes of its relationship to the shareholders, to society and to the state, it is never justified in pursuing tax strategies that have as their only goal minimizing the corporation's tax payments to the government.
Conclusion: Just Say No
From the corporation's perspective, it thus seems that whatever our view of the nature of the corporation, it should not be permitted to engage in strategic behavior that is designed solely to minimize its taxes. From an artificial entity perspective such behavior undermines the special bond between the state and the corporations it created. From the real entity perspective such behavior is as unacceptable as it would be if all individual citizens engaged in it. And from an aggregate perspective strategic tax behavior does not leave the state adequate revenues to fulfill the increased obligations imposed on it by forbidding corporations to engage in CSR.
What are the implications for a case like Caterpillar?
Most US corporations nowadays acknowledge that in addition to maximizing profits and value for their shareholders, they also have a responsibility to other stakeholders such as their employees and customers, as well as to US society. It is rare to find a US-based multinational that does not declare on its web site that it is committed to CSR, despite the critiques launched against CSR in academic circles.
Until the early 1990s, most large US corporations also did not engage in aggressive strategies designed to reduce their US tax obligations. In my experience as a tax lawyer in the late 1980s and early 1990s, corporations engaged tax counsel to advise them on the most tax efficient structure of a deal that was motivated by valid business But the underlying problem persists: The prevailing attitude among large US corporations now seems to be that aggressive tax planning that is not motivated by business purposes is justified because of competitiveness considerations ("everyone does it, especially our foreign competitors") and because it enhances shareholder value. The argument seems to be that paying taxes is a cost that reduces corporate profits and this negatively impacts the value of the shares. Thus, some US corporations engaged in so-called inversion transactions in which they nominally became subsidiaries of a foreign parent (typically in Bermuda) with no substantive change in their business (the headquarters stayed in the US) because these transactions enabled them to strip profits out of the US and the reduction in the US effective tax rate translated into higher share values.
There are several problems with this type of argument. First, US corporations somehow managed to do without such aggressive tax planning for many decades without impeding either their competitiveness or their market valuation. Second, there is no clear evidence that a reduction in the effective US tax rate translates into higher share values; stock market prices are influenced by many factors and there are plenty of publicly traded US corporations that derive most of their profits from the US, pay a high US effective tax rate, but nevertheless have high stock prices. Third, if US corporations do not pay their fair share of tax, someone else has to pay, and shifting the tax burden to others (including to your own shareholders who are also taxpayers)
hardly seems like a good way of maintaining CSR. Good citizenship includes paying the "price of civilization", especially since the value of the shares also depends on public goods like education, infrastructure and defense that have to be paid for by tax revenues.
In the Caterpillar case, a legendary US corporation was induced by a major US accounting firm to shift its tax planning in a way that moves a significant part of its profits from the US to Switzerland, without changing the underlying business model.
There are ways in which the IRS can combat this type of tax aggressiveness, but it failed to do so, perhaps because at the time it was confronted with a deluge of even more aggressive shelters, and it did not have access to all the information that became public at the 2014 Senate hearing. I suspect that there are other cases in which major corporations were able to engage in tax strategies that they knew lacked economic Therefore, in the end, I believe that the only real solution is to change the attitude of major US multinationals back to where it was when the 1986 Tax Reform Act was enacted. Back then, a tax director of a major US multinational would typically see aggressive tax motivated transactions as inconsistent with CSR, and would simply reject them if brought to him. The proper response of a corporate tax director to a proposed transaction that he or she knows is not motivated by a valid business purpose (even if it can be dressed up like one and even if he or she thinks it might possibly prevail in litigation) is to just say no.
